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Introduction
In the referential communication task designed by Krauss and Glucksberg (1977) , pairs of participants sat on opposite sides of a blind and had to verbally coordinate in order to arrange a series of drawings according to a chart only available to one of them ('the Director'). Krauss and Glucksberg report that adults 'found the task trivially easy […] and made virtually no errors on their very first try ' (1977:101) . In the late nineties, Keysar and colleagues adapted the referential communication task to investigate language comprehension using eye tracking.
It is somewhat ironic, given the good performance initially observed, that since the referential communication task was adapted for eye tracking, it has become a test of miscommunication.
In the eye-tracking version, commonly known as the 'Director task' (DT), a participant follows the instructions of a confederate to move around various objects in a vertical grid of squares. The confederate sits on the other side of the grid and cannot see all the objects because some of the cells are occluded on her side. Crucially, the confederate is supposed to be ignorant about the contents of those cells, and when she asks the participant to 'move the small candle', for example, the smallest of three candles is only visible to the participant.
Over a long series of studies, participants have shown a tendency to consider, and sometimes even reach for, the smallest candle in their privileged view before picking up the mediumsized candle in open view (e.g., Keysar et al., 2000 Keysar et al., , 2003 Barr, 2008; Converse et al., 2008; Begeer et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2010) .
Participants' performance in the DT was interpreted by Keysar and colleagues as evidence for an 'egocentric bias' in communication, according to which listeners initially comprehend language egocentrically. This view sparked a long-standing debate with other researchers who argued that listeners use common-ground information from the earliest stages of language interpretation (e.g., Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004; Heller et al., 2008; Brown-Schmidt, 2012 ). The present study did not aim to contribute to this psycholinguistics debate, but rather to challenge Keysar et al.'s view that the DT is a reliable test of Theory of Mind use in communication.
The Director task in social cognition research
Psycholinguistics studies always ensured that participants believed that the confederate Director was a naïve participant (e.g., Keysar et al., 2003; Barr, 2008) . However, it has been shown that using confederates, instead of pairs of naïve participants, may compromise the reliability of experimental pragmatics studies (Lockridge & Brennan, 2002; Kuhlen & Brennan, 2010) . Recent social cognition studies have disregarded these studies and used computer versions of the DT, in which participants have to pretend that a static human figure depicted behind a grid is the Director (e.g., Apperly et al., 2010; Dumontheil et al., 2010a Dumontheil et al., , 2010b Santiesteban el al., 2015; Symeonidou et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2016) . Apperly, Carroll, Samson, Humphreys, Qureshi and Moffitt (2010) admit that this setup may not be a naturalistic test, yet they nonetheless conclude that their results support Keysar et al.'s view that adults are rather poor at using Theory of Mind inferences in language interpretation. Apperly et al. (2010, Experiment 3; Dumontheil et al., 2010a; Symeonidou et al., 2016) observed that participants suffered more interference from their privileged perspective when following the instructions of an avatar Director, than when applying an arbitrary rule to ignore the objects in the occluded/dark-background cells. Apperly et al. (2010) argue that only the former condition requires perspective taking, and interpret their results as evidence that Theory of Mind inferences are costly. Santiesteban, Shah, White, Bird and Heyes (2015) also compared two conditions, one with a human figure as the Director and another one with a picture of a camera instead of a 4 director. This study aimed to test Heyes's (2014) claim that people often 'submentalize' and use domain-general cognitive mechanisms in social situations rather than representing other people's mental states (i.e. mentalizing). Santiesteban et al. argue that participants in the DT use object-centered spatial coding rather than perspective taking, and explain the better performance observed by Apperly and colleagues in the arbitrary-rule condition as the result of not requiring object-spatial coding to perform the task (rather than not requiring perspective taking).
As they had predicted, Santiesteban et al. observed similar performances with the Director and the camera, both with neurotypical adults and adults with autism spectrum disorders, and interpreted their results as supporting evidence that 'adults use mentalizing sparingly in psychological experiments and in everyday life ' (2015:844) . Before reaching 
Aims and scope of the DT
In order to determine whether interlocutors take each other's perspective in communication, experimental studies must ensure that the speaker's and hearer's perspectives are different; otherwise, interlocutors may be using their own perspective as a default (Keysar, 1997) . In this respect the DT is a suitable test of perspective taking in communication. However, by keeping the Director and the participant's perspectives apart, the DT also makes demands on participants' Executive Control, potentially taxing their performance independently from their Theory of Mind use. This argument has previously been used to explain young children's failure in false-belief tasks (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2010) . By contrast, adults' poor performance in the DT has generally been interpreted as a failure to use their Theory of Mind in communication, rather than as a possible effect of the high Executive Control demands of the task. Lin et al. (2010) showed that performance on the DT does rely on participants' attentional resources (see also Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Symeodinou et al., 2016) . However, rather than challenging the general assumption that poor performance in the DT must reveal limited use of Theory of Mind (vs. heavy demands on Executive Control), Lin et al. concluded that using Theory of Mind in communication is generally effortful. This broad conclusion is clearly not warranted by the results of Lin et al. (2010) , who only used the DT in their study and did not include any other pragmatic tasks that may be less dependent on attentional resources.
Building on the Executive Control argument, I want to further argue that the design of the DT prevents participants from relying on a universal assumption in human communication:
namely, that people know more than what they can see and are therefore able to refer to entities outside their visual field. Participants in the DT are expected to suppress this basic truth and assume that the Director only knows about the objects she can see on the grid.
Therefore, while the DT may seem 'simple' (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009) , it is in fact a highly artificial test of referential communication.
In what follows I will challenge the view that adults' difficulties with the DT are evidence of 'limited use of Theory of Mind in communication' (Keysar, Lin, Barr, 2003; Apperly et al., 2010) , and defend that it is the design of the DT which limits participants' perspective-taking abilities by imposing artificial demands on their selective attention. In order to test the view that the DT imposes artificial demands on normal pragmatic processes, I
designed an interactive version of the DT that aimed to challenge the key assumption in this task: when participants consider the hidden objects in the grid as possible referents for the Director's instructions, they are not necessarily failing to use their Theory of Mind.
Pairs of naïve participants played this new DT on two computers, where they saw 2x2 grids of objects. One of the four cells in each grid had a grey background and contained an object in the Follower's grid, but was empty in the Director's (see Table 1 ). The critical trials included a subtle manipulation: unbeknownst to the participants, the position of the grey cell was shifted in the Director's grid, so that a figure that appeared on a grey background in the Follower's grid, now appeared on a white background in the Director's. The Director would see two fish of different colours, for example, and ask the Follower for 'the orange fish'. However, in the Follower's grid the blue fish appeared on a grey background, thus inviting the question: If the Director cannot see the blue fish, why does she call the target 'the orange fish', and not just 'the fish'? This is a subtle manipulation that need not immediately give away the Director's perspective, as it has been extensively documented that speakers tend to use colour redundantly in referential communication; that is, people will often refer to 'the orange fish' in a display with only one fish (e.g., Sedivy, 2003; Rubio-Fernández, 2016) . Therefore, if The cell with a grey background represented the Follower's privileged ground and its position was counterbalanced across trials. The slides were divided into four conditions depending on the contents of the Follower's grid: in the Filler-1 condition (12 slides), grids included 4 different objects. In the Filler-2 condition, grids included 2 similar objects of different sizes (3 slides) or different colours (3 slides) on a white background. In the Baseline condition (7 slides), grids included 2 identical objects, one on a grey background and one on a white background. In the Critical condition (7 slides), grids included 2 similar objects of different colours, one on a grey background and one on a white background (see Table 1 ).
All the Baseline and Filler-2 trials plus 3 Filler-1 trials were presented before the Critical trials in order to test whether in the second half of the task Followers would grow suspicious that the Director sometimes could see the contents of the grey cell. The number of Baseline and Critical trials was relatively low (7 each) in order not to give participants too many opportunities to suspect that the Director could see what was in the grey cell. Unlike the Critical condition, the Baseline condition did not include two similar objects of different colours to avoid the possibility that when the Director started using colour adjectives in the Critical condition, Followers would simply notice the difference with earlier Baseline trials.
Similarly, the point of the Filler-2 condition was to familiarize the Followers with modified descriptions, so that the instructions of the Critical condition would not attract unnecessary attention. The slides were always presented in the same pseudo-random order.
Procedure
Participants were told that they were going to play a coordination game in which one of them (the Director) would give instructions to the other (the Follower) to click on a target figure in a display. The Experimenter used a colour printout of two grids from the Baseline condition to explain that the Director's and the Follower's grids differed in 3 ways: first, the Follower always saw 4 objects, while the Director only saw 3 because her grey-background cell was empty. Second, only the Director's grid showed an asterisk next to target. Thirdly, the position of the objects was scrambled so as to prevent the Director from using spatial coordinates. Note that these 3 differences were maintained in the Critical condition (despite the shifting of the grey cell). Two patterns of results were predicted: first, those participants who had not noticed anything peculiar in the Director's instructions would not suspect that she sometimes knew about the contents of the grey cell. Presumably, these 'unsuspicious' participants, as I will call them, tried to ignore the grey cell. Their eye movements would reveal generally low proportions of fixations on the grey cell, possibly decreasing during the task due to practice.
Second, those participants who kept track of the contents of the grey cell would have grounds to suspect about the Director's perspective. In the first half of the task, their eye movements should also reveal decreasing attention to the grey cell, due to practice, but in the second half, they should show a growing interest in the contents of the grey cell, due to their suspicion. Overall, their proportions of fixations on the grey cell should be roughly U-shaped across the Baseline and Critical conditions.
Results
Of the 21 Followers in the study, only 4 failed to notice anything peculiar in the Director's instructions (19%). As expected, these unsuspicious participants reported to have tried to block the grey cell as a potential distractor. The remaining 17 participants noticed that the Director included too much information in the instructions. Of these participants, only one did not suspect that the Director could see what was in the grey cell, and explained that she thought the Director was being helpful by describing the targets in too much detail. The remaining 16 participants (76%) were suspicious because in some trials the Director would use a colour word that helped them choose between the target and the object in the grey cell.
All suspicious participants were able to provide 1-3 examples of Critical trials.
Participants were significantly above chance at getting suspicious of the Director's knowledge (p < .027, Binomial test, two-tailed). Also importantly, their responses to the posttest questionnaire confirm that those Followers who kept track of the contents of the grey cell were actually taking the Director's perspective while doing so.
Mouse-click responses revealed perfectly accurate performance (as expected in 2x2 grids). Mouse-click RTs were not accurate enough for reliable statistical analysis for two reasons: first, Followers' speed of response was affected by the location of the mouse cursor at the time of hearing the name of the target object. Second, instructions were formulated differently across and within Directors (e.g., 'Click on the brown dog' vs. 'The puppy') also affecting Followers' speed of response across conditions. Note that this is not a problem in studies using avatar Directors or confederates because the instructions are either pre-recorded or formulated in the same way for all participants.
The proportions of fixations on the grey cell made by the 5 unsuspicious Followers are reported in Table 2 , and the eye-tracking data for the suspicious Followers are plotted in Figure 1 . The data reported in Table 2 was not sufficient to carry out reliable statistical analysis, therefore ruling out a comparison with the suspicious participants. However, eyeballing the looks to the grey cell made by the 5 unsuspicious Followers does not seem to suggest that these data fit a U-shaped distribution. This may be because 4 of these participants reported to have tried to focus their attention on the 3 white cells during the task. While I acknowledge that the eye-tracking data for these participants is not strong enough to confirm this selective-attention strategy, I interpret their responses to the post-test questionnaire as evidence that they were adopting such a strategy.
The eye-tracking data of the suspicious Followers were compared in the first 3 trials The number at the base of each bar indicates how many Followers did not fixate on the grey cell in that particular trial. Those data points were retained in the statistical analysis.
Statistical analyses were conducted using the lmer function from the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2014) The eye-tracking analyses of the suspicious participants confirm their responses to the questionnaire: by keeping track of the hidden object, these participants were able to keep track of the Director's perspective.
Discussion
The DT makes participants restrict the Director's referential domain to those objects in her visual field, thus posing highly artificial demands on participants' pragmatic abilities. Keysar et al., 2000 Keysar et al., , 2003 Converse et al., 2008; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Apperly et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2015) . Moreover, most of these studies have failed to account for the large number of studies that have reliably shown perspective taking in communication using the DT and other paradigms (e.g., Lockridge & Brennan, 2002; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002; Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004; Heller et al., 2008 Heller et al., , 2012 Brown-Schmidt, 2009 , 2012 Kuhlen & Brennan, 2010) .
The results of this study show that optimal performance in the DT, as conceived by the defendants of the egocentric view (Keysar et al., 2003; Apperly et al., 2010) conclusion that adults only use mentalizing sparingly in psychology experiments and in everyday life. In fact, the large majority of participants were able to take the Director's perspective while keeping track of the contents of the grey cell. These results are also more reliable than those of Santiesteban et al. (2015) , who used a static human figure and prerecorded instructions instead of a live Director. Therefore, future experimental pragmatics studies should adopt this new eye-tracking paradigm and investigate not only how listeners take the speaker's perspective in referential communication, but also how they update this perspective during interaction.
Although more naturalistic than previous studies, the new interactive DT uses artificial rules in a verbal coordination game, leaving open the question of how often people mentalize in everyday conversation. A simple example (adapted from Geurts & Rubio-Fernández, 2015) suggests that this is a complex question that requires investigation: imagine you board a train and sit next to an old lady who breaks the ice by saying: 'It's windy today… Just like the day you were born'. Your automatic response would probably be to wonder: How does this woman know when I was born? Since the old lady did not use mental state verbs or express a subjective opinion that could require 'explicit mentalizing' (Heyes, 2014) , we must assume that this automatic inference was triggered by the old lady's making of a statement, which presupposes her knowledge.
Future research should investigate how and when automatic pragmatic inferences are derived, as this could provide a critical test of mentalizing -or submentalizing -in everyday communication.
